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ABSTRACT
This thesis is designed to investigate the practice of Islamic banks within different economic,
financial, social, legal and religious environments, with a view to determining whether or not the
Islamic banking theory is reflected in practice. It covers three Islamic banks working in different
environments: in London where Al-Baralca International Bank Limited works as an Islamic bank
in a non-Islamic country; in Jordan where Jordan Islamic Bank works as an Islamic bank in an
Islamic country and in Turkey where Al-Baraka Turkish Finance House works as an Islamic bank
in a secular country with a predominantly Muslim population.
The major findings are:
1 The study shows that while P.L.S. is central to the theory of Islamic banking, in practice it
is peripheral. None of the banks studied looked at P.L.S. contracts as a contract which
should dominate their transactions because it was perceived to be too risky to be adopted
and it had too many loopholes from a commercial point of view. Morabaha was the main
type of transaction adopted by all three banks.
2 Islamic values do shape strategic goals and determine the priorities of the Islamic banks.
Islamic banks do not violate Islamic law, even for guaranteed profitable deals. The three
criteria by which Islamic banks assess a possible financial project are: (i) that it does not
violate Islamic law; (ii) that it should maximize the bank's profit; (iii) minimize perceived
risk.
3 Whether the Islamic banks are operating in an Islamic banking system is not a decisive
factor in their success or survival, what is decisive is that the peculiar nature of Islamic
banks is to be secured by specific legislation.
4 One of the major problems facing Islamic banks is to find long, medium and short-term
investments which are at once commercially effective and Islamically acceptable. In
particular, Islamic banks will, at least in the foreseeable future need to focus on a
complementary role, providing an avenue for Muslims to save and invest in an Islamically
acceptable way.
ii
Dedicated:
To my loving parents
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Praise is due to the Creator Who made this thesis possible despite all hurdles and constraints.
My first thanks and deepest gratitude go to the Director of Studies, Dr Brian Shaw, for his
dedication, intellectual stimulus and drive. Coupled with these qualities is a depth of human
kindness and moral support which I found very moving. I would also like to thank Hazel, his
wife, for her ever welcoming encouragement no matter what unsocial hour I tried to contact Dr
Shaw.
Thanks are due to my External Supervisor Dr David Browning, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies,
St Cross College and my Internal Supervisor Professor Trevor Watkins now Vice Chancellor and
Deputy Chief Executive, South Bank University for their comments on my thesis.
This research would not have been possible without the full support of the Al-Baraka Group,
especially Sheikh Saleh Kamel, Dr Mohammed Abdo Yamani and Dr Hassan Kamel.
The continuous support of Duncan Smith, and his speedy and very constructive comments on the
quality of the research were all a tremendous encouragement.
Many thanks are also due to Dr M. Ahsan, Dr Y. Awadi, Mr K. Bharmia, Dr F.A. Nizami,
Mr Y. Ohner, Dr J. Qureshi, L. Rhymes, Mr M. Shehadah, Dr G. Speake and Dr Y. Tamimi.









Part One
Review of Literature
2
Chapter 1
The Introduction


5
c) Profit-and-loss-sharing i.e. mudarabah and musharakah is the concept which underlies
Islamic banking theory and practice.
d) Islamic values determine the selection and implementation of the strategic goals and
priorities of Islamic banks and ensure that the banks operate Islamically.
The terms used in the statement of the aims of the thesis are fairly familiar but not necessarily clear.
We can assume (because there is a universal consensus among Muslim scholars) that prohibiton of
ribd in the QurIn is prohibiton of interest, i.e. lending money at a fixed rate of return over a
specified period. The Qurin prohibits ribd in the most vigorous terms (Qur'n, Chapter 2).
However, it is important to note that the QurIn also permits and encourages commerce. This is a
characteristic of Islam that halal (what is permitted) is encouraged alongside the prohibition of what
is /pram (prohibited). Ideally, Muslims should not only fight against ribd but must also actively
promote legitimate business so as to succeed commercially in this world. This is the example of
the Prophet Muhammad himself and of his companions. Islamic banks cannot be judged to be
successful and sufficiently Islamic simply because they have (at least formally) eliminated interest
from their transactions, but rather they must show that they are profitable and that they have
contributed to the economic vigour and prosperity of the society in which they operate.
This thesis is divided into three parts, as follows:
Part One - Review of Literature
Part one is made up of three chapters: Chapter 1 presents the background to the thesis (or general
introduction) while Chapters 2 and 3 identify the general theoretical frameworks of Islamic
economics and Islamic banking theory.
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Part Two - Research Methodology and Case Studies
Chapter 4 develops the research methodology. Chapters 5-7 study the modus operandi of
Al-Baraka banks working in a Western environment, in an Islamic environment and then in a
secular environment (with Muslim communities) in the light of existing theory and further ideas
and proposals developed in this thesis. Attention shall be restricted to three organisations in this
study, namely, Al-Baraka International Bank Ltd (London, UK), the Jordan Islamic Bank for
Finance and Investment (Amman, Jordan) and Al-Baraka Turkish Finance House (Istanbul,
Turkey).
Part Three - The Results
Chapter 8 is the comparative analysis chapter which compares the three case studies in the light of
the hypotheses which the thesis promises to investigate. Chapter 9 is the conclusions and
recommendations. Chapter 10 - Future of Islamic Banks: the evidence tends to suggest that
Islamic banks have a great deal to learn from conventional banks as regards techniques
(accounting, auditing procedures, management, etc.) which would make their operations more
viable. Equally, conventional banks (whose operations for a number of reasons are increasingly
coming into question) have much to learn from Islamic banking, in particular the relevance of
ethical investment, socially responsible decision-making, and greater preference for trading in
actual assets and actual wealth.
Chapter 2
General Theoretical Framework of Islamic Economics
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assertions, and then work out the consequences. However, there are substantial problems
associated with research in this field. Most of them have to do with the fact that Islamic economics
is a new discipline with uncertain boundaries and without the conceptual and analytical
sophistication of conventional economics:
a) Because Islamic economics has only recently come to be used as a rationale for determining
policy objectives and implementation, the data available for analysis is, relatively, limited
(Yalcintas, 1987).
b) There is a shortage of scholars sufficiently qualified in both the relevant disciplines, namely
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and modern (conventional) economics (Zarqa, 1987).
c) There is, as a result of the shortage of relevant data and qualified personnel, a retardation of
the theoretical development of the discipline, i.e. in consequence, theoretical analysis of
the practical implementation of Islamic economics lacks the methodology, the tools
(concepts, specialist terms) needed to proceed confidently and at a pace (Ahmad, 1987b).
d i) A symptom of the theoretical naiveté of the discipline is a common confusion between a
ruling on a particular issue given by a particular scholar working within the principles of
the Law, and the principles of the law. The authority of the principle(s) from which the
ruling is derived is accorded, without the proper reservations and qualifications, to the
ruling itself (Yalcintas, 1987).
ii) A second symptom is the failure to establish modes of reasoning which will allow the
individual to determine, for a particular problem, the relevance of arguments fromfiqh or
from conventional economics (Zarqa, 1987).
A third important symptom is the lack of criteria for determining whether a whole theory of
all possible economic relations or transactions is needed, or if Islamic economics could or
should confine itself to particular sectors of the economy or to particular sorts of transaction
(Abdul-Jabir, 1987).
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In sum, Islam recognizes the right to own property for consumption and for production (14, 32-
34):
It is God who has created the heavens and the earth and sends down rain from the skies
and with it brings out fruits wherewith to feed you; it is He who has made the ships subject
to you, that you may sail through the sea by His command; and the rivers (also) has He
made subject to you - And He has made subject to you the sun and the moon, both
diligently pursuing their courses, and the night and the day has He (also) made subject to
you. And He gives you of all that you ask for. But if you count the favours (gifts) of
God, never will you be able to number them. Verily, man is given up to injustice and
ingratitude.
This indicates clearly that God has made practically unlimited resources available to mankind.
Thus the economic problem of man in Islamic philosophy does not stem from scarcity, as claimed
in capitalism, or from exploitation of production relationships, as the marxists claim, but from the
utilization of these resources in accordance with God's dictates.
Three basic principles are accepted in the sharta as to the way this should be done:
a) Ownership of resources by man is not absolute. It is a social obligation to be undertaken
within the limits set for it. Allah owns the resources and man is only a trustee in their use.
b) The way to pursue the acquisition and development of resources, i.e. the economic aspect
of man's life, is likewise not completely free; there are moral and legal constraints.
c) Although individuals are allowed to own wealth in the normal way, the final aim is that this
wealth should be of use to the community as a whole: social solidarity is the justification
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and aim of the Islamic economy. Wealth can come into the possession of any individual
through his or her work, or through inheritance and grants but these too are conceived of
as, originally, the results of work.
All forms of activities that allow an individual to acquire wealth in a harrTm way are strictly
prohibited. These include (Hamidi, 1986):
a) Monopoly in all forms2.
b) Hoarding.
c) Gambling and betting in all forms.
d) Cheating in quality, quantity, weight or any specifications of the goods and services traded
or acquired or disposed of.
e) All trade malpractices (e.g. creating artificial scarcities, etc.)
f) Speculation in all forms that might be used to scoop windfall profits, not justified by the
real value of the assets traded or being developed. (These might include modem practices
of closed deals in forward sale of currencies, commodities, shares etc. Spot sales or open
deals subject to risk are another matter.)
g) All types of fraudulent sale or sales used as an excuse to charge interest.
For example if the dealers in a commodity refuse to sell it, despite the fact that people are in need of it,
unless they secure a price higher than its known value they must be compelled to sell it at a price equal to
the price of an equivalent commodity (Qaradawi, n.d.).
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this worldly necessity, but viewed as a religious virtue or even as an obligation, provided the
activity conforms to sharVa. Thus, while both trading and ribJ generate an increase in capital, the
increase generated by trading is welcome, and only that generated by rilZ is forbidden. Sharta
does not consider money as a commodity such that there should be a price for its use. Money is a
medium of exchange in an asset-orientated economy; money is just a means of exchange and store
of value. It is not allowed to be a commodity (it cannot be in view of the prohibition of interest
which allows trading in loans).
The difference between the trade and riba among other things, is the fact that the business risk in
trading is more evenly allocated among all the parties involved, whereas in KM operations the
business risk lies heavily, if not solely, with the borrower (Ashker, 1987).
3.4 Zakah
Zakah is a tax levied on all persons having wealth above an exemption limit, in order to purify their
wealth and their souls. The rate of tax and the exemption limit are set by the shari 'a (Khan,
1990a). The main purpose of the tax is redistribution of wealth and income. However, the
transfer of income generates changes in the composition of demand for commodities that satisfy
basic needs. Consequently, the composition of aggregate supply should change in the direction of
more food, clothing and shelter and fewer luxuries (Kahf, 1982). The proper recipients of
expenditure of zakah funds are specified in the Qur'Un (9:60); the poor and the needy, zakah
collectors, new converts to Islam, travellers (when in difficulty), in the way of Allah, the relief of
captives and debtors, and otherwise as interpreted by Muslim scholars.
16
Most Muslim scholars believe that a major objective of za16512 is to alleviate poverty. That objective
is not left to private individuals, although charity (sadaqa) is also strongly encouraged. Without
doubt zalaTh is meant to be collected and distributed in an organized collective way (Salama, 1982).
The basic instrument for circulation of wealth in an Islamic society is a mandatory, fixed and stable
tax, collection and payment of which is a religious duty. It is not a fiscal measure subject to
variations of government policies (Uzair, 1981).
Zakah is calculated at 2.5% of the total value of capital and profits minus bad debts and
depreciation. In agriculture it varies from 2.5% to 10% according to the type of irrigation. There
is a different way for calculating the tax on livestock. Zakah should be collected and distributed
locally. Only the surplus may be expended elsewhere and must be expended according to the
heads of expenditure indicated in the Qur'an.
3.5 The role of government in the economy
The two major objectives of Islamic government in relation to the economic life of the community
are (Abbadi, 1977):
a) To enable rich and varied economic activity in compliance with the law. This involves
supervision of the different transactions and functions in which people engage, and the
provision of legal mechanisms to settle any disputes that may arise. It also involves the
appointment of officials to ensure the freedom of the market from hoarding and monopoly
and to guarantee standards (coinage, weights, measures, etc.).
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b) To raise revenues in order to secure the administration of shari`a laws and norms, central
among which is the achievement of a degree of distributive justice. This objective is served
directly through the collection and distribution of zakdh revenues, and indirectly through
maintenance of Islamic inheritance laws which also ensure a measure of wealth division
and circulation.
The role of government is recognized and affirmed in Islam. That role is a limited one, but one
vital for the smooth running of an Islamic economy. Whenever a market fails to operate on its
own, an Islamic government may step in to remedy the situation using various policies at its
disposal. The Prophet used to inspect markets to check business frauds and other market
imperfections. Once he cautioned a fraudulent trader saying: 'whosoever cheats is not one of us'.
An Islamic government has to take responsibility for certain fundamental economic goals such as
the eradication of poverty, the creation of employment, the maximization of economic growth, the
establishment of an equitable distribution system and socio-economic justice, the creation of a
conducive environment for economic activities and so on. The welfare functions of an Islamic
government include moral and spiritual education as well as the material development of an Islamic
economy (Jalaluddin, 1991).
In Chapra's opinion (Chapra, 1981) we should follow closely the essential functions of the Islamic
welfare state with respect to the economy outlined above. In summary form:
a) to eradicate poverty and create conditions for full employment and a high rate of growth;
b) to promote stability in the real value of money;
c) to maintain law and order;
d) to ensure social and economic justice;
e) to arrange social security and foster equitable distribution of income and wealth; and
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In Islamic economics it is clear that economic considerations are subordinated to moral
considerations, as for instance in the verse prohibiting ribc7 (interest) wherein the practice is
described as gross injustice. The general requirement is that both the ends and the means must be
Islamically legitimate (Naqvi, 1981). Beyond that, great emphasis is laid on maintaining a balance
between the conflicting interests of individuals and the different sections of society (Zaman,
1991).
Regarding Islamic banks, the relevance of Islamic banking to ethical banking generally is that it
offers a number of alternative approaches to the banker-customer relationship. It helps to stimulate
new thinking about alternative banking and possible ethical solutions to emerging problems such as
coping with the underclass and financing small businesses based on networks or communes.
What we witness in the growth of Islamic banks is the growth of a type of banking which
explicitly asserts its ethical values (Lynch, 1991).
Chapter 3
Islamic Banking Theory
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It has also sought to promote the establishment of Islamic banks by contributions to their equity. It
has an Investment Deposit Scheme in operation under which the Islamic banks are able to place
their surplus funds in the Bank's foreign trade financing operations in accordance with the
principles of sharra (I.D.B., 1981b).
The I.D.B. has also offered training facilities to the Islamic banks through its Islamic Research and
Training Institute. It is also engaged in setting up new procedures for co-financing arrangements
with Islamic banks and for development of a trade and leasing portfolio (the Islamic Banks
portfolio managed by I.D.B. on behalf of twenty-two Islamic banks). The resources will be
mobilised through the issuing of certificates which will be negotiable and tradeable among Islamic
banks.
The Islamic banks for their part have very high expectations of the I.D.B. and expect it to play
something of a parental role, plead their case with governments and central banks of member
countries and to use any leverage it may have with them for the purpose of helping the Islamic
banks.
In recent years the Islamic banks have evinced growing interest in using the I.D.B.'s Investment
Deposit Scheme to place their surplus funds. This is the result of several factors:
a) there has been a larger inflow of deposits into these banks as they have become established
and confidence in them has grown;
b) the return which they offer to depositors has become especially attractive as deposit rates
have generally fallen in the international money market.
The two most positive aspects of the I.D.B. are its treatment of the Islamic world as a single
region, and application of the shaf Pa to development (Abdel-Haq, 1991).
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3.4 Musharakah
This is a financing technique in which a capital owner finances investment in another party's
business. Additional finance is provided to the party (individual or group) who already has some
funds for investment. The finance provider provides the additional funds on the condition that he
shares in the profits from the business. The ratio in which the finance provider shares the profits
of the business with the party receiving the additional funds is fixed and predetermined, and made
known in advance to all concerned. The loss, however, will be shared in the exact proportion of
the capital invested by each party. The profit-sharing ratio is left to be mutually agreed upon and
may be different from the ratio in which the two parties (finance provider and user) have invested
in the total capital of the project. This is because the two parties may share the work of managing
the project in any amount mutually agreed upon. Both parties are allowed to charge a fee or wage
for any management or other labour put into the project (Khan, 1987). All providers of capital are
entitled to participate in management but are not necessarily required to do so. The musharakah is
continuous if the partnership lasts as long as the business operates (Khan and Mirakhor, 1987).
These techniques are very similar because the provider of finance directly shares the profits and is
contracted to bear the losses, if any, to the extent of his investment. That is why these two
techniques are often put together into one category known as profit-and-loss-sharing. In Islamic
banking, with the replacement of interest by profit-and-loss-sharing from the return on the capital
advanced by the banks, repayment depends entirely on the productivity of the projected enterprise
(Siddiqui, 1987).
Necessarily, the norm for an Islamic bank will be to assess the productivity of a project and back
those projects which promise the highest rate of profit. Thus, projects for funding through
partnership are expected to be selected primarily on the basis of their anticipated profitability rather
than the credit-worthiness or solvency of the borrower. The relationship between finance and
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the instalments paid until such time as the investment account contains the identical amount the
bank paid to purchase the building equipment or facility. The client becomes owner of the financed
equipment and the contract ends (Siddiqui, 1986).
3.7 Morabaha
This is a cost-plus contract in which a client, wishing to purchase equipment or goods, requests the
Islamic bank to purchase the items and sell them to him at cost plus a declared profit (Ali, 1987).
By this technique a party needing finance to purchase certain goods gets the necessary finance on a
deferred payment basis. The finance-provider does the purchasing of the required goods and sells
them on the basis of a fixed mark-up profit, agreeing to defer the receipt of the value of the goods
even though the goods can be delivered immediately.
The need for finance of the one in need is thus met. He needed funds to purchase certain
commodities (e.g. raw material or capital goods or even consumer goods). His purchase is
financed, and paid for at some later date, though he may end up paying more than he would have
paid if he had his own money to purchase these goods. The desire of the finance-owner to earn
income on his capital is also met. He makes profit in terms of the mutually agreed-upon mark-up
(Hamoud, 1985).
This financing technique is sometimes considered to be the same as interest because a person who
needed say $1,000 to purchase certain goods gets the funds but ends up paying a 10% additional
value which does look like paying interest. However in theory the mark-up is not in fact in the
nature of a compensation for time or deferred payment, though the entire cost had to be incurred
because the needy person did not have means at hand to make the purchase he wanted. The mark-
up is for the services that the finance owner provides, namely, seeking out and locating and
purchasing required goods at the best price. This is a recognized service which can be paid for and
whose value is predeterminable. Furthermore, the mark-up is not related to time since, if the
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financed person is unable to pay in time as agreed, the amount of mark-up remains as fixed in the
contract - it does not increase due to delay in payment (Khan, 1988).
Consider the position of finance provider - what justifies his earning the fixed mark-up? Firstly,
he provides a definite service in the form of obtaining the goods for his client, for which service he
can charge a fixed price. Secondly, in obtaining the goods, he is taking a risk. The client may not
accept the quality or price at which he purchased and the financier is then stuck with the goods.
This risk is over and above the risks normally involved in trading activity - such as storage costs,
damage in storage or in transit, etc. All these risks justify his earning profit; they also mean that,
though he has fixed the mark-up, he may not necessarily end up making profit or getting the rate of
return on his capital equal to the amount of mark-up fixed at the time of contract (Khan, 1988).
The morabaha type of contract suggests a difference in price familiar in conventional economics as
the difference between cash price and credit sale price. The question naturally arises: under the
shari`a, is a seller allowed to charge a higher price for a credit sale than for a cash sale? (Khan,
1988). The short answer is yes, but four conditions must be satisfied:
a) the buyer must be told that the price is a credit price and the difference between the credit
and cash price must be made known to him;
b) the buyer must have been given the option of buying at either price;
c) the buyer must be told if the goods being sold were originally purchased at a credit price;
d) the transaction must be a trade transaction (as distinct from a purely financial one).
The last condition above introduces a particular distinction between the time-value associated with
trade transactions and the time-value attached to purely financial transactions. While the former are
permissible, the latter are not. This is a very important point that has been often and widely
confused. Time has a value when it is associated with trade transactions in particular, but it does
not have a value when it is associated with purely financial transactions. In trade credit, the
difference between credit price and cash price varies with the profitability of the business. The
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defaulters; the only guarantee of timely payment is the credit-worthiness of the purchaser. This
defect can be countered by enacting suitable laws allowing for the imposition of monetary fines on
malicious defaulters. The amount of the fine on recovery shall have to be deposited in the
government treasury and not used as income by the seller (Zaidi, 1983).
4.2 Bai Salam
This is also a trade transaction and not a loan transaction. Under this arrangement, the buyer
(financier) agrees to purchase a commodity from the producer in advance and pays the agreed price
immediately but the commodity is delivered at a future date (Qudah, 1981). The details of
commodity and its quality, price and time/place of delivery are specified. Now if the banks embark
upon financing on this the practical problems in dealing with millions of farmers can be well
imagined. Taking delivery of the produce, assessing its quality, storage and disposal, all have to
be considered. Bai salam has no practical advantage over bai muwajjal (Hawari, 1984). Such
sales have not been used by Islamic banks in the field of agricultural financing. As mentioned, the
produce is delivered at a future date against an advance payment for it. Its main conditions as
agreed upon by the majority of Muslim jurists are (Hamidi, 1986):
a) The agreed price for the produce to be delivered should be paid immediately at the time of
contract, cash in full.
b) Delivery of the goods must be postponed for a definite fixed time.
c) The goods to be delivered should be of a type that is commonly available at the time fixed
for delivery i.e. the contract should not specify delivery of goods from a certain plot or
location. This is to ensure the financier against unnecessary risk and to enable the farmer to
deliver produce which he may obtain from another source if need be. However, the
contract must specify clearly the kind, description and quality of goods to be delivered.
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nature of their relationship with their clients. In the case of Islamic banks the relationship is one of
direct trading or participation and not that of lender/borrower. Furthermore, Islamic banks do not
trade in debts as conventional banks do. Therefore, central bank regulation of Islamic banks,
undoubtedly essential, should take into consideration the special nature of these banks as
formulated in their statutes. A controversy has arisen recently about whether it is necessary to
devise special legislation for regulation of Islamic banks or to make do with the rules applying to
conventional banks in this respect (Radwan, 1990). Central banks in some countries, for example
Jordan, have issued special legislation concerning Islamic banks; other countries have issued
special legislation concerning Islamic banks but refuse to call them Islamic banks and call them
Special Finance Houses (Turkey). Other countries, for example the U.K., have not.
Theoretically, the main function of central banking in an Islamic financial system is the provision
of the institutional framework necessary for the smooth operation of financial markets in
compliance with the rules of the sharta. In particular, the central bank has the task of fostering the
development of primary, secondary and money markets. It is important to mention that mere
adoption of Islamic rules of finance will not necessarily create the impetus for financial and
economic development where the shallowness of financial markets and lack of attractive financial
instruments limit the scope for financial intermediation. (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 1987)
There is a consensus among Muslim economists that the central bank should supervise the Islamic
commercial banks. This supervision should not be confined to a formal audit of transactions but
should also encompass a material appraisal of the quality of management decisions especially with
respect to the more risky P.L.S. financings. One of the aims of this supervision is to protect the
clients who have put their money into investment accounts against avoidable losses. Minimum
reserve requirements are suggested for similar reasons (Nienhaus, n.d.).
In general, the central bank in an Islamic economy would continue to have the power to regulate
banking and financial operations so as to allocate resources in conformity with the priorities of
society as well as to direct monetary policy towards specific goals.
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rent. It might be argued, for example, that rent includes time value of money and, since rent is
predetermined, a predetermined time value of money must by analogy be permitted in Islam also.
This is incorrect. It is indeed true that the rent of an asset is calculated in a way that will realize not
only the value of the asset but a certain time value of money as well. But this calculation is made
over the life of the asset, which life is in principle uncertain - nor is it necessarily the case that an
asset will earn rent continuously throughout its life. Hence, how much time value of money is
actually realized remains uncertain until the asset has completed its economic life.
Finally, there are two related points which need clarifying in this context:
a) The argument that an uncertain rate of inflation makes the real rate of return on an interest-
based loan a risk-bearing investment is not acceptable in Islam. Once we call it a loan,
nothing can be charged on it irrespective of whether inflation or any other consideration
makes the charge positive or negative in real terms. All financing is termed a loan when the
principal remains guaranteed whether in nominal or real terms (Khan, 1988).
b) In theory, in mark-up-based financing the financier faces all the costs and risks normally
involved in trading activity - locating and buying goods, storage, damage in transit, etc.
Furthermore, the finance provider also runs the risk that the goods purchased for the
finance user may not be finally accepted by the latter on account of quality or other reasons.
It is such risks that, in principle and in reality, keep the rate of return uncertain until the
goods have been finally handed over to the finance user.
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Chapter 4
Research Methodology
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addressing each hypothesies. It appears that this is the first study which uses Islamic banking
clients as a source of data. The interviewing of members of Al-Baraka began with a six-week visit
to the headquarters of Al-Baraka in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for a preliminary study of the Group.
At the meetings attended by the researcher the subjects discussed were: i) establishing the new
Islamic banks in Pakistan, India, South Africa and China; ii) the problems they had with the
monetary authorities and finding local share holders in each country. Advice was sought through
unstructured interviewing with executives in the headquarters, about the research design, in
particular the research samples and nature of the Al-Baraka Group (i.e. the structure, the history,
the development and the future, etc.). After that three separate questionnaires were prepared for
executives, managers and clients. Interviews were then carried out in London where Al-Baraka
International Bank Limited works as an Islamic bank in a non-Islamic country (for one month), in
Jordan where the Jordan Islamic Bank works as an Islamic bank in an Islamic country and in
Turkey where Al-Baraka Turkish Finance House works as an Islamic bank in a secular country
within a Muslim society (for almost three weeks). Some of the transcripts of the interviews were
sent to interviewees for verification of the facts and further discussions have been carried out with
the employees in these three banks on a non-structured interviewing basis (see Appendix 1 for the
questionnaires). Visits were made to the International Association of Islamic Banks, and Saleh
Kamel Centre for Islamic Economics, with its associations with Al-Azhar University. There has
been continuous dialogue and debate with Islamic economic scholars from all over the World who
have visited the Islamic Foundation and the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies. A particularly
valuable experience was the one day seminar the researcher set up in the Oxford Centre for Islamic
Studies. The main speakers were Professor K. Ahmad, Dr F. Khan and Mr D. Smith. It was
attended by Islamic scholars, academics and bankers, where the key areas studied in the seminar
were how to promote Islamic banking performance.
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case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life
context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which
multiple sources of evidence are used'. This methodology appeared relevant in that we are
investigating a contemporary phenomenon with real life context i.e. Islamic banks in different
environments where the boundary between the phenomenon and the context is not clear. Evidence
of these problems of boundaries is illustrated by looking at the following: i) the bank was the
context and the phenomenon was the financial instrument within the bank; ii) the context was
Islamic banking and the phenomenon was Al-Baraka Group; iii) the banking system was the
context and the phenomenon was Islamic banking, especially its relationship with the cetktral bank;
iv) the context was Islamic values and the phenomenon was the Islamic banks, i.e. how they
recognize and implement these values in their operations and transactions.
Multiple resources of evidence were used as suggested by Denzin (1989): 'no single method will
ever meet the requirement of interaction theory. Multiple methods of observations must be
employed, this is what is called triangulation of data sources and methods'. And this hecessitz,ted-.
a) Participant observation and non-participant observation - to develop the
knowledge or understanding received from the interviews and from the interpretation of
literature. The key activity here was attending the Al-Baraka Annual Conference which
was held in Torquay, England in September 1991, which included the top management of
all Al-Baraka banks and the other banks which related to them. The objectives of that
conference were, mainly to evaluate the performance of the Group, to exchange
experiences for the future directions and to discuss the situation of Al-Baraka International
Bank, London. As a result of the researcher being the official interpreter for the conference
it provided him with a great deal of information which it would not have been possible to
obtain without his being there. He also attended a board meeting for one of the Al-Baraka
banks immediately after the conference. This provided an opportunity to observe the way
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that they are not guaranteed. As conventional banks also guarantee current accounts, there
is no contradiction with Islamic law in the case of current accounts, nor with
implementation of the protection scheme should a crisis occur.
However, in the case of deposit accounts which, in normal operations, conventional banks
also guarantee (and indeed the whole of the deposit is guaranteed), there is a contradiction
with Islamic law. According to sharra requirements investment accounts must be subject
to profit-and-loss-sharing; any guarantee of principal or of the result of its use is a violation
of sharra requirements.
In the event of a crisis the Bank of England, under the protection scheme, as stated above,
guarantees up to £20,000 per account per institution. This is intended to provide partial
cover of depositors' losses, but even this partial cover contradicts the sharra. The
A.I.B.L., in operating under the jurisdiction of the Bank of England, must follow its laws.
With regard to all other conditions also the Bank of England requires that Al-Baraka meet
them.
A.I.B.L., as an Islamic L.D.T., has not faced major obstacles in satisfying the Bank of
England on the questions of capital adequacy and liquidity. The minimum requirement for
a L.D.T. under the 1987 Banking Act is £1,000,000. A.I.B.L. began with £5,000,000 at
the start of its UK operations, a sum subsequently increased to £10,000,000. In 1988 the
figure had risen to £30,000,000. It was decided to inject fresh capital of £15,000,000 in
1990 in order to strengthen A.I.B.L. further.
Thus, as far as the capital requirement is concerned, A.I.B.L. will not face a difficulty.
However, A.I.B.L's difficulty arises in satisfying the Bank of England in the area of
liquidity and asset management. In order to do so, A.I.B.L. has invested most of its short-
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follows:
a) Current account. This type of account is the same as provided by conventional banks
where by clients deposit funds with A.I.B.L. for safe keeping and with transaction
motives. It is regarded as a demand deposit and guaranteed by A.I.B.L. A.I.B.L.
provides all the current account facilities that a conventional bank offers (cheque book,
standing orders, etc.). No profit or return is offered on this type of account.
b) Bonus current account. This account is similar to the savings and deposit accounts in
conventional banks. A.I.B.L. accepts deposits from clients and, as with the current
account, is allowed to use the funds. A.I.B.L. guarantees the principal deposited. The
main difference between the current and the bonus current accounts is that if the cleared
balance maintained in the latter averages £2,500 (the bonus level) or more for a period of
six calendar months, a bonus will be credited to it. The question to be raised here is how
this differs from payment of interest. According to sharta we must differentiate between
an obligation to add a certain bonus after a certain term, and a non-obligatory addition of a
bonus. In the latter case, there is no violation of Islamic law. If, however, the depositor
has a right to demand a bonus after a certain term, this amounts to riba and a severe
violation of Islamic law (Abdel-Haq, 1989).
c) Fixed-term deposit account - invested in accordance with the Islamic principles of
mudarabah, musharakah and morabaha. A minimum deposit of L500 or $1,000 is required
to open such an account. The minimum term is one month and the gross return to
depositors is based on a percentage of the monthly profit yield earned on the bank's
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In interviews with executives at A.I.B.L., managers and selected clients were asked what criteria
influenced them in deciding whether or not to get involved in any new business. Answers were
always given without any reluctance or hesitation or suspicion and all interviewees said that the
very first thing they do is to ensure that the potential project does not contradict Islamic values. If
it does, all said they reject it immediately. I also asked them whether they would take on a project
which did contradict sharr a but which was 100% profitable. They all answered that they would
never enter into any transaction which violated sharra.
In Al-Baraka's Chairman's speech at the last Annual Conference which was held in Torquay,
England, 1991, he insisted that all top management refuse any deals which were unacceptable in
Islamic law even if they were 100% profitable. The Chairman said 'I do not want to find out that
any of my colleagues, for any reason and under any circumstances, did any deal with anything
which was not acceptable in Islamic Law. We do not want any haram profit. I would like to be
able to tell Allah on the day of judgement that all my investments were halal.'
But despite all of that there will always be a chance of misunderstandings from time to time. For
example, in 1991, there was a memo circulated by the senior manager asking the branch managers
to charge for any overdraft. Plainly this senior manager does not know even the basics of Islamic
economics: any extra money above the principal makes the loan a riba transaction which is
forbidden in Islamic economics. An employee raised this point with the Chairman of Al-Baraka
during one of his visits to London and the memo was withdrawn. Here we can see that not only
was the Chairman's directive ignored but nor was the sharr a consultant asked for his advice, and
that raises the role of the shari`a adviser and his authority in the bank.
From an analysis of the literature of social responsibility it is very difficult to determine the
definition of it and how the social responsibility could be quantified. There is a considerable
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debate in this area and it is a very controversial issue. In order to make some assessment of
A.I.B.L.'s social responsibility it was necessary to set some criteria by which the existence and
effectiveness of the social responsibility policy within A.I.B.L. could be measured.
So here A.I.B.L. will be considered to have a social responsibility policy if there is a positive
response to the following questions:
a) whether A.I.B.L. implements a profit-and-loss-sharing policy on a wide scale or not;
b) whether A.I.B.L. has an interest-free loan policy;
c) whether A.I.B.L. contributes to develop social projects which could help the community in
England.
With regard to the first question, through interviews with the five executives, the evidence tends to
suggest that A.I.B.L. has completely stopped dealing with profit-and-loss-sharing for the reasons
which will be explained later in this chapter. With regard to the second question, the evidence also
tends to suggest, through the A.I.B.L. Annual Reports 1986-1990, that A.I.B.L. does not have an
interest-free loans policy. In an interview with the ex-Chief Executive of A.I.B.L. and one of his
branch managers, they were asked whether A.I.B.L. has such a policy for interest-free loans and if
not why not. The answers in both cases were: 'No! A.I.B.L. does not have such a policy. We
sometimes provide interest-free loans in very very rare circumstances'; and the justification for this
policy which was given was 'we are not a charity'. Regarding question three, it was found
through the interviews that A.I.B.L. has not contributed so far to any development project for the
Muslim community in England.
When the Chief Executive was asked what criteria they use for their investment policies in
A.I.B.L. the answer was that 'once sure that the project does not violate sharta, A.I.B.L. adopts
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the conventional banking investment criteria before taking any decision', which are as follows:
a) credit risk (credit-worthiness, duration, etc...);
b) return;
c) complexity;
d) administrative cost (documentation, monitoring);
e) how well the project fits in with the bank's strategy and its other assets.
The adaption by A.I.B.L. to Islamic values as a code for its investments is considered to be a
major constraint on the bank's investment activity. In an interview with the former and current
chief executives they said that: ' Shari' a is one of our major obstacles, in that there are not enough
investment products that are Islamically acceptable and profitable enough to allow A.I.B.L. to
invest all the funds available.' Thus A.I.B.L. has a major dilemma which was confirmed by
Nienhaus (1988) when he said: 'Islamic banks will always be at an instrumental disadvantage
compared to conventional banks. If the Islamic banks develop new investment instruments.
Conventional banks are not prevented from adapting their practice if they judge it profitable. By
contrast, Islamic banks cannot adopt the instruments available to conventional banks'.
From these interviews it became obvious that A.I.B.L. faces a perplexity: while A.I.B.L. is trying
not to make any deal which confronts Islamic law, which is causing it to lose a lot of investment
opportunities, at the same time it is trying to match the conventional banks in terms of profit. This
was confirmed in an interview with one of the A.I.B.L. executives when he was asked, how do
you determine your profit on the investments you enter into. He said 'we put into our
consideration the current rate of interest and we work in a parallel to it'.
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depositors. This criterion is in essence a basic assessment of whether the institution's directors,
controllers and managers are fit and proper people to hold their respective positions (Penn, 1989).
When asked about the major obstacles facing A.I.B.L. in London the former and the current chief-
executives pointed out the following:
i) the insufficient number of believers willing to deal with Islamic banks;
ii) the constraints of sharica itself: there are not enough investment products that are
Islamically acceptable and profitable enough to allow A.I.B.L. to invest all the funds under
their management. So they have virtually a cash surplus problem. (When asked what are
the advantages of being an Islamic bank operating in London the answer was there are no
advantages at all!);
iii) the tough restrictions of the Bank of England, especially since the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International scandal;
iv) the lack of availability of experienced bankers within Islamic banking;
v) the size of the bank's capital which is too small to compete with in London: 'the capital of
the Lloyds Branch next to us is bigger that the capital of the A.I.B.L', the chief executive
said (The fact that in point ii the complaint is a cash surplus and in point v it is the
insufficiency of capital is an indication of the confused way in which the management of
the bank handles and analyses its problems);
vi) the great competition from non-Islamic financial institutions. When this point was raised, I
asked how A.I.B.L. competes with conventional banks in London The answer was that
A.I.B.L. does not compete with anyone. Apparently 'they' are competing with A.I.B.L.
by opening Islamic investment units within their conventional operations.
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When I asked whether A.I.B.L's banking operations and activities take more time than the same
operations in conventional banks, the answer given was `no, on the whole'. However, the top
management's view (executives) was that A.I.B.L. did take longer for the following reasons:
i) lack of efficiency;
ii) the instruments that have been developed so far are not flexible;
iii) A.I.B.L. does not have enough products;
iv) A.I.B.L. until now has not had a standard form for its operations and transactions. There
are no fixed investment criteria. Each transaction is studied separately. This is time-
consuming and therefore could be added to the cost of the decision making.
Also senior managers were asked whether there are any extra costs or operational expenses that the
Islamic banks have to pay because they are Islamic? The answer was `yes', in what they called
bank placements, especially with bank-to-bank business. When Al-Baraka Islamic Bank makes
short-term deposits in another conventional bank it has to ensure that the investment is Islamically
acceptable. A senior banker in Citibank said: 'There is an extra cost to this which is borne by the
Islamic bank. In the simpler bank-guaranteed placements through conventional banks, trading
goods and merchandise is more expensive than placing them (conventionally) in the interbank
deposit market.' When I asked the senior manager of one of the Islamic departments in a
conventional bank why A.I.B.L. does not make its own investments, he said because A.I.B.L. is
not interested to take the high risk which is involved in the investments, he was then asked again:
Does that mean that your bank does not care about the risk? He said, 'Of course it cares, but we
have better techniques and more qualified staff to evaluate the risk of whether it is acceptable or
not', and when two executives of A.I.B.L. were asked why do you ask other banks to do
investments on your behalf, their answer was `there is not enough opportunity, so we are forced to
ask others to do our investments on our behalf'. Finally when I asked five managers of A.I.B.L.
whether A.I.B.L. employees get any special training when working in an Islamic bank, they said
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The absence of these two vital ingredients is illustrated below:
- In terms of service, there was no cheque books available for three months for the
clients, and the reason was that the officer responsible just forgot to order cheque
books from the printing house.
In terms of point (ii) above, A.I.B.L. has only four branches, three of them in
London and the other in Birmingham, and this does not cover the Muslim
community in Britain.
We see that A.I.B.L. has neither of the vital ingredients. The services within A.I.B.L. are not
competitive in terms of variety or in terms of the way they are offered to the public.
When I interviewed ten clients of Al-Baraka, London, I asked them why they deposited their
money at A.I.B.L. The reasons they gave were as follows:
i) because it is Islamic: 8 out of 10 gave this as the main reason;
ii) because it is Islamic: 2 out of 10 gave this as one of the advantages;
iii) because it is an Arab bank: 2 out of 10 gave this as one of the reasons;
iv) because it has a large widespread network: 4 out of 10 gave this as one of the reasons;
v) because a friend introduced me: 2 out of 10, one gave it as a reason and the other gave this
as the main reason;
vi) because it is close to home (convenient): 3 out of 10, one of them as the main reason.
All the clients whom I interviewed were disappointed with the services and the treatment they got
from A.I.B.L.
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A.I.B.L. appears to have between 11,000 to 12,000 depositors' accounts, distributed between
only four branches, one in Birmingham and the rest in London. The choice of location for the
bank's branches is largely dependent on the potential number within the Muslim community as
well as the economic activity in the area, as the Marketing Director said. A great number of the
depositors are Gulf Arabs, in London for the summer period. The number of depositors is small,
and the reason for this poor showing is one or both of the following:
The Muslims in this country do not believe that Al-Baraka is a proper Islamic bank. There
is some justification for this, given the way that most of the employees conduct themselves,
and given that A.I.B.L. does not fulfil its promises to its clients as stated in its leaflet.
The marketing is inefficient. To date the evidence suggests that the management of
A.I.B.L. are keen to achieve quick profits in order to prove to shareholders that they are
qualified to deal with other banks. As a result they neglect the basic thing in the banking
industry, the mainstay of it, namely the clients. They try to make big deals with other
banks and with big traders and neglect individual clients and small customers. Any visitor
to the Edgware Road branch would be shocked by the uncaring attitude of the staff and the
long wait the clients have before they are served.
As to the question 'what is A.I.B.L.'s policy of profit distribution?' the answer was as follows:
At the Al-Baraka Annual Conference, the Chairman said to his Chief Executives, and he
was talking mainly about A.I.B.L., that from this year (1992) the Al-Baraka Group will no
longer cover the bank's loss for their depositors. He was saying this in order to urge the
management of the bank to work harder to achieve at least a break-even point. The
assumption was that A.I.B.L's policy of profit distribution for their depositors was not to
let them suffer any loss. And the loss, totally and entirely, was transferred to the
shareholders, in order to motivate and encourage the depositors to stay with A.I.B.L.
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A number of sources mentioned to the researcher that more than two-thirds of the total deposits of
A.I.B.L. came from the companies and banks belonging to Al-Baraka Group. What does this
mean? It means that the "impressive" growth of the A.I.B.L. deposits was the result, not of
successful management in attracting more money and clients, but of the increase from the
shareholders' money either directly or indirectly through their companies' deposits.
In comparing 1985 with 1991 results in A.I.B.L. only in terms of:
i) ratio deposits to assets;
ii) ratio of capital to deposits;
iii) ratio of investment revenue to total of deposit and capital, we will find the following:
TABLE 4
AL-BARAKA INTERNATIONAL BANK LIMITED (A.I.B.L):
A COMPARISON BETWEEN 1985 AND 1991
1985 1991
Total Assets 37,374,339 191,422,000
Total Deposit 23,106,850 153,750,000
Capital 10,000,000 49,976,000
Total Investments 33,000,000 183,000,000
Profit before Tax 141,889 (6,851,000)
Resources: The A.I.B.L. Annual Reports and Accounts for 1985 and 1991
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TABLE 5
AL-BARAKA INTERNATIONAL BANK LIMITED (A.I.B.L):
A RATIO'S COMPARISON BETWEEN 1985 AND 1991
1985 1991
Ratio of Deposit to Assets 61% 80%
Ratio of Capital to Deposits 43% 29%
Ratio of Investment Revenue
to Total Deposit and Capital 0.4% -3.7%
From the above it may be seen that the ratio of deposit to asset (the proportion of deposits placed in
investment assets) has increased from 1985 to 1991 by 19%, whereas the ratio of capital to deposit
has decreased by 14%. And the ratio of investment revenue to total deposit and capital has
decreased by 4.1%. Therefore in comparing these ratios we find that the increase in deposits and
capital looks more like a burden and a disadvantage rather than an advantage. When questioned
about the reasons for losses in 1990 and how this bad result could be explained, the Chief
Executive said:
i) A.I.B.L. is a pioneering experiment in the London market;
ii) costs are very high in London;
iii) great competition;
iv) lack of qualified management;
v) inability to invest more funds in medium-term projects highlights the general difficulty
A.I.B.L. has in finding projects to suit its criteria.
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Finally this study of a pioneering experiment in Islamic banking in London suggests that there are
major difficulties in operating Islamically in the context of a non-Muslim society's financial
system. The key difficulties appear to be:
i) the major revenue in the City involves the payment of interest, for example interest on
loans, future markets, etc., all of which and A.I.B.L. is unable to use to generate profit;
ii) the sophistication and the strength of competition of the conventional banks arise from
more than three hundred years of existence which makes it difficult for A.I.B.L. to
compete in terms of the services it offers. The only thing which can distinguish A.I.B.L.
is that it can offer its clients 1,zaIJI profit. Therefore future growth must come principally
from new ways of generating halM profit;
iii) A.I.B.L. has failed to win the confidence of the Muslim community in England as they
have only 11,000 depositors;
iv) A.I.B.L. is facing tough supervision from the Bank of England, and because of this is at a
disadvantage. The fact that the Bank of England has not recognized the special nature of
A.I.B.L. as an Islamic bank and has not issuued a special law for it, and the memory of the
B.C.C.I. scandal, are both contributing factors which put A.I.B.L. under very tough
restrictions;
v) the fact that A.I.B.L. does invest most of its short-term funds via the merchant banks raises
the question about the quality of its staff.
Chapter 6
"The Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment" (J.I.B.):
The Experience of an Islamic Bank in Jordan
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Chapter one comprised definitions and general provisions; chapter two pointed out the objectives
and functions of the bank; chapter three the capital; chapter four acceptance of deposits and issue of
al-muquaradah bonds; chapter five rules governing the activities of the bank; chapter six
management of the bank and general meetings; chapter nine final accounts, balance sheet and
profit-and-loss accounts; chapter ten liability to income tax. From this document we can
understand that the Central Bank recognized Islamic banking as a new movement in Jordan, and
believed that it needed a special law, so it issued this one. The law tries to cover the most
important issues and expresses them in detail in a way intended to help the Islamic banking
movement. But, as mentioned, Jordan still has only one Islamic bank. There used to be an
Islamic finance house which collapsed due to management corruption and not for any reason
connected with Islamic banking. At present the Jordanian authorities do not contemplate issuing a
licence to establish another Islamic bank (the General Manager of the J.I.B. mentioned this in an
interview), and the Monetary Authority does not allow the conventional banks in Jordan to open an
Islamic banking counter (interviews with the Governor of the Central Bank of Jordan). The
conventional banks have formally complained to the Central Bank about this. The complaint was
lodged after a major account was shifted from one of the conventional banks to the Jordan Islamic
Bank (Liwa, 1980). Shallah (1990) in his paper mentioned that the J.I.B. is constrained by the
Central Bank's regulations including the prescribed reserve requirements, liquidity ratios and other
constraints related to credit control in the country. It is worth mentioning, however, that the J.I.B.
is deprived of a number of facilities given to other banks: for example, the J.I.B. does not benefit
from facilities provided by the Central Bank as the lender in the last resort, to support banks which
experience a need for prompt liquidity. Unlike the commercial banks, the J.I.B. is also deprived
of facilities (given to conventional banks) to encourage exports at a discounted rate.
Wilson believes that the Jordan Central Bank has responded positively to the establishment of
Islamic banks in Jordan and recognized that many believers were unhappy with the kind of
banking facilities offered by the riba commercial banks, and this statement was supported by the
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ii) Deposits subject-to-notice. The minimum amount required to open a notice
deposit account is similar to that of the time deposit mentioned above. These
deposits differ from time deposits in that depositors are not allowed to withdraw
any of their funds without 90 days advance notice in writing. The share in profits
is about 20% for the bank and 80% for the client of the profit declared by the
management.
iiii) Saving accounts. In these deposits the client can withdraw and deposit at any
time and can deposit any amount according to the conditions specified by the bank.
The minimum balance that is required for investment and for a share in profits is set
at JD 100. Saving deposits participate in profits realized from investments at the
rate of 50% of the declared profit.
iv) Specific investment account. Cash deposits received by the bank from
persons desiring to appoint the bank as an agent for investment of these deposits in
a specific project or in a specific manner on the basis that the bank will receive a
part of the net profits realized, but without liability for any losses not attributable to
any violation or default by the bank.
Other banking services
These include:
i) accepting cash deposits; current and deposit accounts of various types—the bank
pays and clears clients' cheques, collects bills of exchange, transfers funds within
or outside the kingdom, opens documentary credits and gives notification thereof,
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ii) Investment of funds, the owners of which desire to invest them jointly with the
other resources available to the bank on a joint mutlarabah basis. In particular cases
the bank may invest the funds in a specified manner by special agreement.
The researcher asked the General Manager of Jordan Islamic Bank and seven managers working in
Jordan: What are the functions and the role of your bank? Do you see your bank as a
developmental institution or profit-seeking institution or a social development institution? The
answers which were given vary. Some of them believe that Islamic banks are entirely profit-
seeking institutions and that there is no difference between them and conventional intermediary
banks apart from the interest rate. Some others believe that an Islamic bank's second aim should
be the development of the community in which the bank exists. Others believe that Islamic banks
cannot be profit-seeking institutions because of their nature and because Islamic law prevents them
from using the market instruments most of which depend on interest. So Islamic banks are
developmental banks by nature. When those people who support this view were asked whether
there is anything the Jordan Islamic Bank does that other conventional banks do not, the answer
was 'yes, we are distinguished for the following reasons':
a) We offer our clients zakrih services; we distribute zakäh on their behalf if they wish;
b) We have a qard hasan fund to help the people who face a serious problem, especially for
medical treatment, for studying and for marriages;
c) We are trying hard to implement P.L.S. as long as the interest of the bank is not going to
be in jeopardy;
d) Lastly and most importantly we finally succeeded in overcoming the dilemma which a lot of
Muslim societies have had, which was how to bank and invest money in the banking
system without violating Islamic law.
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As stated in the Jordan Islamic Banks Law, chapter 8, which is entitled 'Legal Consultant on
Islamic Law', section 27 deals with the selection of a specialist in the practice of Islamic law, who
is to be appointed as an Islamic legal consultant, and who can only be dismissed on the approval of
at least a two-thirds majority of the Board of Directors. Section 28 of the chapter requests the
Board of Directors to determine the functions of the aforesaid Islamic legal consultant on the basis
that the Board shall be under a duty to request the opinion of the Islamic legal consultant regarding
the following matters:
a) Studying the practical regulations and rules applied by the Bank in its dealing with others,
with a view to ensuring that they do not contain any form of usurious dealings which the
Bank is obligated to avoid;
b) Studying the causes which require the Bank to bear any investment loss, with a view to
finding the legal doctrinal (flqhi) basis to support the resolution of the Board in this regard.
So the Board of Directors of J.I.B. appoint their sharra consultant whose remit is to study the
bank's instructions and operations in all its various deals and transactions and ensure that they do
not, either implicitly or explicitly, have any sort of illegal aspect, from an Islamic point of view.
Shallah (1990) states that, 'according to the bank's law, the board of directors is entitled to appoint
and dismiss the sharra adviser. His remuneration is also to be fixed by the board of directors.
Thus such status for the sharra adviser has been criticized by many Muslim scholars since it may
threaten his independence to give the correct judgement without undermining his own position.'
The J.I.B. Board of Directors, however, did appoint one of the most highly respected sharr a
scholars, Sheikh Abdel-Hameed Al-Sa`ih. It appears that J.I.B.'s motive for appointing him was
only to seek proper criticism from a professional scholar. In the sharr`a adviser's opinion a
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booklet should be prepared and be available to clients (and others) to inform them of the details of
sharr a provisions regarding the bank's operations.
Regarding ethical banking, three executives of the Jordan Islamic Bank were asked how far Islamic
values shape strategic goals and whether they can be translated into institutional forms that operate
Islamically and whether or not Islamic transactions or investments can still be profitable from an
economic point of view. The unanimous answer was that they will never accept any deals which
could violate Islamic law, either explicitly or implicitly. Regarding whether the Islamic
transactions can still be profitable from an economic point of view, the answer was 'yes we could
still make profit'. While some of the interviewees expressed a view that it could be more difficult,
the J.I.B. General Manager said that what actually makes his bank a profitable one is being an
Islamic bank.
Two managers in J.I.B. were asked in interviews what criteria they applied when deciding whether
or not to get involved in any new business. The answer, given without reluctance or hesitation,
was that they ensure that the project being assessed does not contradict Islamic norms and values,
and if any transaction did or might do so, they would not enter into it under any circumstances.
Regarding social responsibility in J.I.B. Shallah (1990) suggested two questions which are
relevant here before judging how far the J.I.B. accepts social responsibility among its objectives:
how successful is the bank in mobilizing financial resources (attracting deposits)? and are these
resources successfully deployed to promote socio-economic development?
The J.I.B. (since 1987) ranks third amongst Jordanian banks in terms of deposit growth; since
then it has also become the third in terms of deposit size. In other words the J.I.B. has overtaken
some leading banks such as the Jordan National Bank and the Bank of Jordan, which implies that
the confidence of Muslims in the JIB. is growing: it does not necessarily mean, as Shallah
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concluded, that there is increasing confidence in Islamic business, or that the Muslims in Jordan
are becoming more devoted to Islam.
The social impact of J.I.B.'s policies is primarily related to two areas of its activities:
a) Interest free loans. This is the only kind of transaction in which an Islamic bank can give a
cash loan to its clients while not expecting any profit or charging commission. Such loans
are made out of social responsibility and not for any other reasons. The J.I.B. has
determined that interest-free loans should only be made in cases of personal need, for
example, a) marriage; b) education; c) medical needs. In these cases the bank lends the
maximum amount of JD 500 repayable within 12 months.
Recently the bank has established a new, interest-free loan fund to hold the deposits of
people who want to give to the needy. By the end of 1991 there were JD 38,000 in this
account. The total amount of interest-free loans given by the bank (including those from
this fund) was JD 1.13 million and 3,131 people benefited from them. In 1990 the total
was JD 1.1 million and the number of beneficiaries was 2,664. It could be concluded from
the above record that the J.I.B. is trying to practise its social responsibility through giving
these interest-free loans, but these loans should be increased to release the people from
hardship (J.I.B, 1991).
b) The J.I.B. is keen to participate in financing the purchasing of equipment and furniture by
educational institutions such as universities and colleges, and to do so on a profit margin
not exceeding 2% (an interview with the General Manager).
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The J.I.B. recruited some of its senior staff from other Jordanian conventional banks. During the
field study at the bank, it was discovered that despite the fact that the management has begun to
give some attention to training its employees, there was a serious lack of a proper training
programme for the J.I.B. employees whether they were in top management or middle
management. For example the Foreign Exchange Currency Manager was asked whether he ever
had a training course or seminar for the currency in the financial market capitals. The answer was
'no'. In the same interview with the Jordan Islamic Bank the General Manager set out the major
obstacles which face J.I.B. as follows:
i) J.I.B. has found itself forced, in order to make up the disadvantage of not being able to use
the Central Bank as a lender of last resort, to:
make most of its financing operations short or medium term;
hold levels of cash in notes in case of emergencies.
ii) Lack of enough financial instruments like bonds: for example, if J.I.B. could hold listed
securities issued by high-quality corporations, this would do as a substitute for cash.
iii) There is a lack of knowledge on the part of clients about Islamic banking instruments.
Thus, when the J.I.B. asks its clients for a percentage of profit on morabaha transactions,
some clients jump to the conclusion that this is a disguised interest-rate transaction. In
other words, some clients who thought that J.I.B. was a charity were disappointed when
they discovered the reality of the situation (i.e. that J.I.B. does not do something for
nothing).






116
assisting farmers with funds and means of production. But Shallah plainly forgets that the bank is
answerable to both shareholders and depositors and must show profitable returns on the moneys
entrusted to it by them, combined with the fact that the agricultural sector in Jordan has always
suffered from very low rates of return (Abdel-Haq, 1979). We should bear in mind that the
reasons behind the bank's financing policies become understandable in an economic (if not
necessarily a social) context.

Chapter 7
"Al-Baraka Turkish Finance House" (Al-Baraka Turk):
The Experience of an Islamic Bank in Turkey
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a Turkish-Kuwaiti joint venture. Al-Baraka Turk received its official permit to operate on 21
January 1985 and opened to the public on 18 February of that year in Istanbul. It was the first to
open branches in other major cities like Ankara, Bursa and Izmir: there are 10 branches in all. In
accordance with the relevant decrees and regulations governing the establishment, organization and
functioning of special finance houses, they are not regarded as conventional banks and are subject
to different rules in the system (the term special finance house is used as an alternative to 'Islamic'
bank because the Turkish constitution does not allow any institution to call itself `Islamic' or to
have 'Islam' as a policy objective.) There are consequential differences in the role of special
finance houses as regards fund collection and fund utilization as we will see later.
3.2 The objectives of Al-Baraka Turk
Mdin objectives and activities of the Al-Baraka Turkish Finance House are as stated in the
Articles of Incorporation (Al-Baraka Turk, 1991):
a) To provide an economic and financial system based on co-operation for the welfare of
society in keeping with norms of justice and benevolence.
b) In addition to the capital of the company, to attract funds and encourage investors to
participate on a non-interest basis. To finance all kinds of agricultural, industrial and
commercial activities and services in joint investments. To issue letters of guarantee. To
finance imports and exports. To obtain equipment related to investments and to sell the
same by instalments or by leasing them.
c) To coordinate scientific and technical expertise and knowhow and direct the same within a
commercial context to serve the welfare of the society.
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banks. He considers this a healthy situation because i) if there are more 'Islamic banks' more
people will know about 'Islamic banking', and ii) it forces each bank to give better services.
The stability and homogeneity in the management personnel at Al-Baraka Turk were given as two
of the most important reasons for its success. These two reasons were given by the Deputy
Chairman and the General Managers. Through the fieldwork study it was observed that the Al-
Baraka Turk employees are very enthusiastic about their work. As for the major obstacles facing
Al-Baraka Turk, the Chairman and General Manager indicated the following:
i) finding suitable staff to work in 'Islamic banking' who have knowledge of sharVa and
banking;
ii) the fact that the clients' attitude is still one of suspicion;
iii) the attitude of the successive governments. The finance houses face the additional obstacle
of how to operate in a secular state. (When asked to explain further, they said: 'We do not
want protection. All that we want from the Central Bank is to let us be equal in the
advantages (e.g. tax advantages, unlimited number of branches). Any conventional bank
needs one billion Turkish lira to open a branch, we need five billion. A conventional
bank's depositors are protected by the government, ours are not. Our responsibility is a
very heavy one.');
iv) the impermissibility (under sharVa law) of giving cash credit;
v) the burden of inflation. Al-Baraka Turk does not enter into any deals of a term longer than
one year because of inflation. Al-Baraka deals with a high rate of inflation usually by
distributing profit at least above the rate of inflation;
vi) cash surplus. There are not enough investment opportunities to match the liquidity which
Al-Baraka Turk enjoys. Further, it cannot deposit this money, for example as an overnight
deposit in another conventional bank and get interest, so this is a problem.
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TABLE 12
A PROFILE OF AL-BARAKA TURKISH FINANCE HOUSE'S
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
T.L. Million
Capital Assets Capital
Assets%
Pre-tax
Profits
Return
on
Capital
Return
on
Assets
1986 5,166,470 48,421,923 10.66% 4,629,548 92.5% 9.5%
1987 10,885,691 98,562,937 11.04% 5,847,730 58.4% 5.9%
1988 12,708,870 312,230,144 4.07% 4,227,250 42.2% 1.35%
1989 16,815,854 687,527,974 2.44% 12,489,450 12.4% 1.8%
1990 26,351,969 1,106,084,876 2.38% 24,397,136 16.2% 2.2%
Source: The Arab-Turkish Finance House Annual Reports and Accounts for
1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990.
If we compare the return on capital and the return on assets for the period 1989-1990, we find a
tremendous difference between Al-Baraka Turk and the Arab-Turkish Bank. While Al-Baraka
achieved 12.4% and 16.2% on return on capital the Arab-Turkish bank suffered a negative return
on capital of -53.6% and -41.4% and we find the same result for the return on assets. In-depth
analysis of the causes of poor performance of Arab-Turkish Bank was not possible but it is
important to mention here that the Arab-Turkish Bank does not represent the Turkish conventional
banking sector in terms of performance but it was chosen for the reason mentioned earlier. So
from the above comparison it appears that Al-Baralca Turk is a more efficient and more profitable
bank.
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Table 13 below shows figures which compare Al-Baralca Turk's position vis-a-vis other special
finance houses, and Tables 14, 15 and 16 show the special finance houses as a category in
comparison with conventional banks in Turkey:
TABLE 13
INTEREST-FREE BANKING SECTOR IN TURKEY:
AN INTRA-SECTORAL COMPARISON, 1991
Million Turkish lira
ABAT KUWAIT EVKAR FAISAL TOTAL
Funds Collected 1,378,525 403,670 811,762 2,593,959
Funds Utilized 1,383,924 308,438 700,164 2,392,526
Paid-in Capital 30,000 30,000 25,000 85,000
Profit 43,829 20,434 14,948 79,211
Table 13 shows the position of Al-Baralca Turk compared to other special finance houses in terms
of the funds collected, funds utilized and profits gained. As it is first in all areas, it seems only
right to observe that in this case Al-Baraka Turk has achieved the greatest absolute level of profit,
while Kuwait Evkar achieved the best return on assets compared to the others. When a
comparison is made among the special finance houses, 'Islam', as a reason for dealing with Al-
Baraka, must be excluded because all of these special finance houses have the same criteria in that
they invest in an Islamic way. Competition between the special finance houses therefore exists on
a purely commercial level.

137
against conventional banks in 1991. While the conventional banks have 6,727 branches and
92,026,000 million TL in deposits, the S.F.Hs' have 21 branches and TL 2,593,959 million in
deposits. If the S.F.Hs' in the 1991 deposit base were in line with the number of their branches,
they should have only TI., 287,281 million; but in reality they have nine times more than this, but in
practice in 1991 they collected TL 2,593,959 million.
TABLE 15
A COMPARISON BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL BANKS AND
SPECIAL FINANCE HOUSES IN TERMS OF FUNDS UTILIZED
Year
Commercial
Bank Credits
SFH
Funds Utilized Percentage
1985 5,604.600 27,086 0.48
1986 7,683,700 71,854 0.93
1987 12,312,400 123,724 1.00
1988 15,806,000 275,669 1.74
1989 25,864,000 682,000 2.63
1990 47,828,000 1,212,592 2.50
1991 72,563,000 2,392,526 3.30
Table 15 shows the improvement in the S.F.Hs' market share vis-à-vis the conventional banks'
credits (i.e. the S.F.Hs' relative growth in investment as set). The figures in both tables suggest
the S.F.Hs' are strong, and have made impressive increases in their deposit market share and
funds utilized market share: within the seven years from 1985 to1991, the former had jumped
from 0.36% to 2.82%, the latter from 0.48% to 3.30% in fund utilization. The growth is all the
more striking, in view of the number of branches conventional banks have (6,727 in 1991) as
against the number for the special finance houses (21).
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experiment offers two major things for its client: the first being 1,1a0 investments and the second
profitable investments.
So it appears more than likely that Al-Baraka Turk will continue its rapid growth within the
Turkish financial market. But despite the successes of the special finance houses in the Turkish
financial market, the evidence tends to suggest that Islamic banking in Turkey, for the forseeable
future, will remain a minority subsector.
Part Three
The Results
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Chapter 8
Three Case Studies:
A Comparative Analysis
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Al-Baraka Turk will continue to grow, but for the forseeable future it will remain a minority
subsector, while J.I.B. will continue to be one of the major players in the Jordanian banking
system. In the case of A.I.B.L. it is hard to envisage what future it has. If A.I.B.L. did not
improve its policies, its client services and attract more qualified people, it will remain in an
unpromising position.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Recommendations
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This thesis is a study designed to investigate the practice of Islamic banks within different
economic, financial, social and religious environments, with a view to determining whether or not
the Islamic banking theory is reflected in practice.
The general conclusions which can be derived from the study are as follows:
a) The study shows that while P.L.S. is central to the theory of Islamic banking, it is quite
peripheral in the actual practice of Islamic banks, and that this is so in each of the three
contexts studied. The unavoidable implication is that the P.L.S. framework is not practised
because it is not practicable. It follows that Islamic economists should try to evolve and to
provide for practising Islamic bankers banking instruments which are Islamically acceptable
and, at the same time, realistic and profitable. The evidence is incontrovertible that Islamic
banks do not enter into P.L.S. contracts because of the perceived high risks involved. The
QurIn does indeed require the eradication of interest and it calls for the encouragement of
legitimate commerce and trade, of legitimate wealth-creation: in neither case does the
Qur'an specify any commitment to particular contracts or types of contract such as P.L.S.
Thus, Islamic banks can be regarded as Islamically successful if they succeed in eradicating
interest from their transactions and promote commerce and trade. Islamic banks may and
should concentrate exclusively on acceptable and profitable economic activity, such as
trading, for instance, in commodities, property investment, property development and asset
leasing. They should solicit deposits for direct investment in those activities and trade
therefore as quasi-investment banks. At the same time Islamic banks cannot, any more
than can any other financial institution, ignore the realities and costs of inflation which
permeate the whole international economy. They must find a solution to this problem in
order to meet the need to maintain the value of their depositors' funds.
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e) The survival and vitality of Islamic banks ultimately depend on the quality of the services
they offer to clients. Failure to provide the full range and right quality of services will
inevitably mean that clients will switch to the 'Islamic counters' of conventional banks.
The Islamic banks should therefore learn from the techniques and experience of
conventional banking whatever will assist them to improve their marketing techniques,
define and deliver services to clients, etc. which confirms Abdul-Jabir (1987) when he said
that 'conventional economics is not irrelevant to either the theory or the implementation of
Islamic economic policy and may in some ways be of greater service'. Secondly, the
Islamic banks must institute a formal, structured staff-training programme: there was no
such programme in any of the Al-Baraka banks studied. In contrast as the Chief Executive
said: conventional banks nowadays spend what would once have been considered
outrageous sums of money on staff training—nor is the training budget trimmed abruptly
with every dip in profit. As pointed out above, Islamic banks' staff would need training in
the relevant areas of Islamic law, as well as in conventional financing techniques.
0 By eliminating interest from their transactions and by proving that profit-and-loss-sharing
is not a practical contract to be adopted, as a result a gap has appeared in the theory which
has not been filled. Islamic economists should find a realistic alternative which is not only
Islamically acceptable but commercially profitable and genuinely different from interest.
Further Research
Further research should be carried out to find and create new investment instruments which are
Islamically acceptable as well as commercially profitable, especially to finance long-term
investments. In addition a solution for Islamic banks needs to be found that would meet the
finance of the consumption needs of their clients.
Chapter 10
The Future of Islamic Banks
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Over the last ten years, Islamic banks have gained a considerable quantitative importance in a
number of countries, in the light of the discussions through this thesis it might be justifiable to
raise the following questions:
Do Islamic banks enjoy a degree of success or not? Is Islamic banking a temporary phenomenon
or one likely to survive? What is the way forward?
As stated previously Islamic banks have successfully negotiated two steps. The first step was
whether it would be possible to establish another system of banking and some scholars started to
lay the theoretical groundwork and background and justified it to Muslims. The second step was
the actual establishment of Islamic banks. The theory became real: people were willing to put their
money in such institutions either as shareholders or as depositors, and business started. Some
early Islamic banks failed and shut down, but others flourished and achieved unexpected results,
still others barely stayed in business without either distinguished or bad performance. The
question needs to be asked—'Is this enough?'
Recently in some countries (e.g. the U.K.) the central banks have allowed conventional banks to
have an Islamic Investment Department or Islamic Banking Counter within the bank in order to
satisfy their clients who want a 1,1a/a/ investment. Then why all this fuss about Islamic banks? If
the Islamic banks think the only reason for their success and survival is that they offer a halcil
investment, then it is hard to see Islamic banking continuing and surviving: sooner or later the
conventional banks will put pressure on their central banks if the Islamic banks start to flourish to
allow them to open 'Islamic' sections within their own non-Islamic banks. The Muslim client who
is interested in following the Islamic code of investment, in making I,taIM profit, may go to an
Islamic bank to help him do so. But when this client learns that the Islamic bank in fact invests its
deposit surplus in Islamic deals with conventional banks, why should the client not, as it were,
skip the middle man, save himself or herself the middle man's fee, and go straight to the /la/a/
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profit counter of a conventional bank? What Islamic banks are doing now in relying on Islamic
Investment Departments within conventional banks could be seen as self-destructive. What Islamic
banks should do, presuming that they have a surplus fund, is to invest their funds in the Islamic
Development Bank's Investment Deposit Scheme rather than to invest them in an Islamic Banking
Department in a conventional bank; at least this would be more justifiable to their clients and would
keep the exclusivity of Islamic banking within Islamic banks
The future of Islamic banks hinges by and large on their ability to find a proper way of investment.
They should be able to create their own investment opportunities by surveying the market both
internally and externally. It is vital for Islamic banks to have the most highly qualified management
teams, committed to the success of Islamic banking:
a) There needs to be an already established, successful banker who can start to put together a
good team. That good team will only be around to be picked if Islamic banks recognize
that proper training is vital if they are to achieve their goals. Training should not be seen as
a luxury, an 'extra', marketing could improve the banks' image with the public, not least
by promoting the fact that they train their employees in banking and in Islamic law.
b) As long as Islamic banks do not prove their usefulness to their societies from the point of
view of socially responsible investments, there will always be a question-mark over the real
difference between them and conventional banks. It is important for people to see that
Islamic banks have given a tangible form to their religious ideology. The challenge facing
Islamic banks is to prove that it is possible to be both economically productive and
compassionate, to seek both economic self-interest and the interest of others, and that there
is no contradiction between ethics and professionalism, competence in one's field and a
permanent commitment to good work in that field.
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c) Last, but not least, the success of Islamic banks depends heavily on their ability to find a
viable alternative to interest for financing all types of loans, especially consumption loans.
They should acknowledge that their success in abolishing interest has been, at the least,
partial, and that they still have a long way to go in their search for a satisfactory alternative.
Part of that way will surely be more quickly travelled if, as we said (point 1 above), they
improve their managerial capabilities by training their personnel in project appraisal,
monitoring, evaluation and performance auditing. Their future depends also on their ability
to develop, and put into practice, accounting standards that provide timely and reliable
information for profit-sharing, rent-sharing or for cost-plus financing transactions. Such
standards are far from adequate at present. Until they are, it is difficult work for Islamic
banks to persuade clients not already persuaded to believe that they (the banks) have a
sufficient and reliable information base from which to conduct and expand their business.
Finally, it is important to remember that the Islamic banking movement has only been around for
twenty years and it is unfair to compare its results with the conventional banks which have been
established almost three hundred years. Islamic banking is still an on-going phenomenon, still in
the making. The challenge for Islamic banks is whether and how to go on surviving, then to
succeed and so become an established, permanent phenomenon.
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Al-Awadi, Yousef A., Managing Director & Chief Executive, Al Baraka Investment Company,
London.
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Investment & Development Co., Shanghai, China.
Al-Ish, Hisham A. Q., Manager, Information and Public Relation Department, Jordan Islamic
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Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Ando, Yoshinori, Chief Representative for the Middle East, The Sanwa Bank Limited, Bahrain
Representative Office, Manama, Bahrain.
Ansouqah, Kaid I., General Director, Al-Baralca Kashakstan Bank, Al-Mata, Khazakistan.
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Ardah, Faisal S., Head Office, Investment Department, Jordan Islamic Bank, Amman, Jordan.
Berooglu, Hakan., Assistant Expert, Foreign Affairs Department, Al Baraka Turk, Istanbul,
Turkey.
Bhairnia, Khalid M., Managing Director, AlBaralca International Bank Limited, London.
Bilytikdeniz, Adnan, Foreign Department Manager, Al Baraka Tiirk, Istanbul, Turkey.
BiiyirkyUksel, Ahmet, Assistant Manager, Foreign Affairs Department, Al Baraka Turkish Finance
House, Istanbul, Turkey.
Campbell, John, Vice President, Middle East Division, Citibank, London.
Cheikh-Rouhou, Moncef, Deputy Chairman and General Manager, B.E.S.T. Bank, Tunis,
Tunisia.
Clarke, J. Brian, Company Secretary, Habibsons Bank Limited, London.
Daredia, Ikbal., Manager, AlBaraka International Bank Limited, London.
Dernirtas, Haluk, Al-Baralca TUrk, Istanbul, Turkey.
Erttirk, Ahmet, Al-Baralca Turk, Istanbul, Turkey.
Hafiz, Omar Zohair, General Manager, Arab Islamic Bank, Bahrain.
Hamouda, M. Kamal., Assistant Manager, Marketing & Customer Services, AlBaraka
International Bank Limited, London.
Hassan, Vaseehar, Chief Executive, Dallah Albaraka (Malaysia) Holdings SDN. BHD. Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
Heath, Jan., Middle East and Financial Institutions Group, Barclays Bank Plc, London.
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Hightower, David F., Vice President, Citibank, Citicorp Investment Bank Limited, London.
Houssami, Hani S., Managing Director & Chief Executive, AlBaraka International Bank Limited,
London.
Jack, Christopher J., Manager, Trade Investments, Saudi International Bank, London.
Kamel, Abdul Aziz A., Director General, Urban Development Est., Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia.
Kamel, Hassan A., Chief Executive, Al Baraka Investment & Development Co., Jeddah,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Kamel, Saleh. The President and the Chairman of Al-Baraka Group.
Kemirtas, Haluk, Al Baraka Turk, Istanbul, Turkey.
Khan, Muhammed Fahim, Professor of Islamic Economics, Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Khan, Tariq, Assistant Manager, Albaralca International Bank Limited, London.
Kiaer, Stanley A., Director, IBE (Institute of Business Ethics), London.
McCorkell, David, Financial Controller, Daiwa Bank (Capital Management) Ltd, London.
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PLC, London.
Mott, Melvyn F., Senior Manager, AlBaralca International Bank Limited, London.
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Muhassiloglu, Ahmet, Al Baraka Turk, Istanbul, Turkey.
Nabulsi, M. S., The Governer, The Central Bank of Jordan, Amman, Jordan.
Nahri, Jamal., The Director of the International Association of Islamic Banks, Cairo, Egypt.
Nasseef, Dr Abdullah Omar, Secretary-General, Muslim World League, Makkah Al-Mukarramah,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Nassief, Nabil A., Managing Director, Faysal Islamic Bank of Bahrain, Jeddah, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia.
Nassur, Bruhan, Assistant Expert, Foreign Affairs Department, Al Baraka Turk, Istanbul, Turkey.
Oomer, R. S., Managing Director, Al Baraka Finance House Limited, Bombay, India.
Oner, Yalgin, General Manager, Al Baraka Turkish Finance House, Mecidiyektiy, Istanbul,
Turkey.
Pasternak, Michael, Portfolio Manager, Saudi International Bank, London.
Robinson, Bruce W., Ex-Head of Corporate Finance, Al Baraka Investment Company, London
and currently Director, Aitken Hume Bank PLC, London.
Salah, Jamal M., Head of Research Department, The Central Bank of Jordan, Amman, Jordan.
Saleem, Ahmed, Manager Advertising & Promotion, Dallah Albaraka, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia.
Saud, Mahmoud Abu, Panama City, Florida, USA.
Shair, Khaled, Regional Managing Director, Al Baraka Bancorp (Chicago), Inc., Illinois, USA.
Shaltout, Khalil., Senior Manager, AlBaralca International Bank Limited, London.
Shihadeh, Musa A., General Manager, Jordan Islamic Bank, Amman, Jordan.
Siddiqi, Adeel Y., Company Secretary, Albaralca International Bank Limited, London.
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Smith, Duncan, The United Bank of Kuwait, London
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Arabia.
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Touloumbadjian, Paul, Vice President, Citibank, Citicorp Investment Bank Limited, London.
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Turkey.
Vogt, Carl J., Senior Advisor, Financial Market Department, Norges Bank, Oslo, Norway.
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V
Conventional bankers believe that P.L.S. depends upon how professional
the bankers are, they have to be careful. Islamic banks should know how
the company does its work on a daily basis in order to be able to achieve
profit.
vii) How do the banks determine their own risk profile?
In the three banks it has been admitted by the General Managers and Chief
Executives that they are trying to minimise the risk involved in their
transactions by implementing the mark-up as the major transaction; and in
A.I.B.L. only, they even ask some Conventional banks, like Citi Bank, to
do investments under mark-up on their behalf. So in practice A.I.B.L. does
not have any risks involved in their investment dealing, while the others
have the minimum risk. The statement used by the Chief Executives and
General Managers is: 'to be an Islamic bank does not mean that we take
larger risks'.
viii) What are the differences between Islamic and Conventional banks?
The majority of the respondents agreed that the major difference is that the
interest rate does not exist in Islamic banks.
Some other respondents mentioned that Islamic banks should be sociably
more responsible towards the Muslim societies in which they operate.


APPENDIX 5
REPLIES AND COMMENTS OF THE INTERVIEWEES
ii
LONDON
The following are summaries of the key points addressing each hypothesis:
1) Islamic banks are profit seeking organisations within the framework of a social
developmental role based upon Islamic law regardless of the environments in which they
operate.
- The commercial Islamic banks aims are firstly, profit, secondly development (the
goals).
- You can achieve just distribution through Islamic banks if they operate under an
Islamic state.
- The role of an Islamic bank is rendering services to the client on an Islamic basis,
but this does not mean charity. We do care about profit.
- The role of A.I.B.L. is a profit oriented institution first, but the nature of our
transactions here is to play a developmental role, however we are neither long-term
developmental banks nor charitable institutions.
We exist only for profit.
The mission of Islamic banks for Muslims is 1,za1J1 profit. For non-Muslims a fairer
system which depends on P.L.S.


V
- Investment criteria policy is: i) the same as other Conventional banks; ii) risk,
type of risk, tener, yield and also cash project has its own position; iii) prudent risk
balance sheet; iv) historical performance.
- Investment policy criteria: i) to be Islamically acceptable; ii) profitable; iii) legally
permissable. We have two laws we should follow - Islamic law and the UK law.
- Problems: i) surplus deposit; ii) lack of short-term investment instruments.
- Obstacles: i) non-co-operation of the authorities in the respective countries (fear
that the Islamic banking movement will convert to a political movement; ii) non-
Islamic environment; iii) being pushed to determine certain levels of profitability by
using the interest rate as a guide line.
- Obstacles: i) restrictions of investment, i.e. lack of short, medium and long term
investments, because we are looking to find an instrument which is Islamically
permissable and profitable at the same time; ii) problem in the asset build-up and
the kinds of assets in Islamic banks is very limited; iii) competing with non-Islamic
institutions; iv) Islamic banks cannot provide the same possibilities as Conventional
banks because of constraints of sharr`a such as; the fact that clients are still
suspicious about whether we work under sharta.
- Islamic banks need some kind of protection from the Central banks, the authorities
should recognise the nature of our business (like taking risks).
Islamic banks will succeed only if society has Islamic faith.









xvi
need five billion. The conventional banks depositors are protected by the
government whereas A.B.A.T. clients are not. A.B.A.T's responsibility is heavy.
There is no sophisticated research section in A.B.A.T.
One of A.B.A.T.'s investment criteria is that they prefer to do business with large
companies who are financially strong.
- Concerning investment critieria, A.B.A.T. has two criteria: i) nothing should
contradict Islam; ii) on a financial basis A.B.A.T. acts on a strictly cca-irriexcial
basis.
- A.B.A.T. investment criteria are as follows: i) minimal risk; ii) companies at least
should be working not less than 3 years; iii) have very strong capital; iv) qualified
managers; v) market potential; vi) good financial statements; vii) profitability; viii)
nothing against sharta and every project should be halal.
.n Lack of short-term investment instruments, i.e. they cannot use overnight
instruments. A.B.A.T. has not got a problem in Turkish Lira because when there
is a surplus A.B.A.T. exchange it into foreign currency, but it has a surplus
problem with foreign currency.
- The Islamic banking theory failed to inform A.B.A.T. how they can invest excess
funds for overnight investments.
- A.B.A.T. is trying to minimize its risk as much as possible.


xviii
The main obstacles: i) finding suitable staff to work in Islamic banks with
knowledge of both Islamic law and banking; ii) the clients attitude - they are still
very suspicious about A.B.A.T; iii) the governments attitude.
n Main obstacles: i) does not give cash credit; ii) the central bank does not look to
A.B.A.T. in a friendly way; iii) the Conventional banks have made a lobby against
us; iv) not enough branches; v) some people believe that Islamic banks are a sort
of Islamic revolution.
- Further development in the next five years in Islamic banking in Turkey is expected
in terms of: i) more banks; ii) more branches; iii) more share in the market.
n A.B.A.T. deals with other conventional banks keeping current accounts with some
of them because they have many branches so they can collect deposits for A.B.A.T.
in the areas which A.B.A.T. has not got branches.
- What is the reason behind making A.B.A.T. the first between the Islamic banks? -
We do not have any problems within our management team like Faisal Bank and
this is the most important point behind our success.
- The way A.B.A.T. encourages people to deposit in the bank is through applying
Islamic principles and at the same time distributing good profit.
- Concerning the clients, we usually distribute our profits at least above inflation -
usually this is an average 66%.
xix
- In Islamic banks in Turkey last year growth was 100%, 70% inflation then the
actual growth is 30%.
A.B.A.T. represents over 50% of Islamic banks shares.
The reason behind Al-Baraka's success is that the management is very stable and
there is no problem between the shareholders.
A.B.A.T. and other Islamic banks do not cover all economic activities. Not all
people prefer to bank with the Islamic banks. Therefore Islamic banks are not an
alternative to conventional banks in Turkey.
- A.B.A.T. has 390 employees.
- A sharra advisor comes in one day a week on an informal basis because it is
against the law.
- So far A.B.A.T. has not ever distributed loss to its clients.
- A.B.A.T. is trying to solve its surplus deposit problem by buying hard currency in
the spot market.
A.B.A.T. encourages people to deposit money through advertisements in the
newspapers and magazines. Some of the advertisements are for customers and
some of them for investors. Also A.B.A.T. publishes (every Tuesday) its profit
for the last 3, 6 and 12 months.

